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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gilbert Gonzales appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained following a warrantless seizure. He argues the police officer did not have
reasonable suspicion for the seizure and the evidence obtained was the fruit of that illegality. Due
to the unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Gonzales asserts the district
court should have granted his suppression motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 2 or 3, 2017, around 1:30 a.m., Officer Scholten of the Coeur d’Alene Police
Department was patrolling a parking lot shared by a La Quinta Hotel and Shari’s Restaurant.
(Tr. Vol. I,1 p.38, Ls.11–18.) Both businesses were open. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.12–15.) In a dark
area of the parking lot, Officer Scholten saw a woman exit a parked Chevy Blazer and walk
towards the La Quinta entrance. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.20–p.39, L.10.) Officer Scholten recognized
her due to her involvement in criminal investigations. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.11–18.) Specifically,
Officer Scholten was “familiar” with her because, “within the past month or two,” she had
reported a vehicle as stolen from an “associate” and then reported it as not stolen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6,
Ls.9–25.) In addition, this woman and at least one other individual, including the “associate,”
were suspected of firearm theft. (Tr. Vol. I, p.7, Ls.2–10.) Officer Scholten exited his patrol car
to contact the woman and ask “what was going on that particular night.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.18–
20.) His patrol car was parked about twenty-feet away from her car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.11–13.)
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There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the suppression
hearing, held on June 1, 2017. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the change of plea
hearing, held on July 14, 2017. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the sentencing hearing,
held on September 6, 2017.
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The woman indicated that she did not want to talk to Officer Scholten, and she continued to walk
away from him towards the La Quinta entrance. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.25–p.10, L.1, p.39, Ls.20–24.)
Officer Scholten “let her go” and went back to her car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.24–25.) He shined his
flashlight inside. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, L.25.) Inside the Chevy Blazer, Officer Scholten saw
Mr. Gonzales lying down on the rear floorboard. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.18–21, p.40, Ls.1–2.)
Mr. Gonzales was on his side in a slight fetal position. (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.2–8, Ls. 14–15.)
Officer Scholten shined his flashlight on himself to show Mr. Gonzales that he was a police
officer. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.9–15, p.42, Ls.1–3.) Officer Scholten had the restraint in his gun
holster undone, but he had not withdrawn the gun. (Tr. Vol. I, p.40, Ls.12–14.)
Mr. Gonzales saw Officer Scholten and exited the car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.1–5.) Officer
Scholten observed Mr. Gonzales to be nervous and twitching.2 (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.5–6.) Officer
Scholten instructed Mr. Gonzales to put his hands behind his back so he could pat him down.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.10–11, p.41, Ls.13–14.) Mr. Gonzales made a slight movement as if to put
his hands behind his back, but then ran away. (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.13–16.) Officer Scholten ran
after him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.21–22.) Law enforcement caught Mr. Gonzales, detained him, and
patted him down for weapons. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.3–4, p.21, Ls.10–11.) While Mr. Gonzales
was detained, Officer Scholten contacted his probation officer and he or she issued an agent’s
warrant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, L.23–p.24, L.9.) Officer Scholten arrested Mr. Gonzales. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.14, Ls.5–7.) Later, law enforcement found methamphetamine on him at the jail. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.14, Ls.17–20, p.22, Ls.17–22.)
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At the suppression hearing, Mr. Gonzales testified that he was under the influence of
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.6–8.)
2

The State charged Mr. Gonzales with one count of possession of a controlled substance,
in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and one count of introducing major contraband into a
correctional facility, in violation of I.C. § 18-2510(3). (R., pp.28–29.)
Mr. Gonzales moved to suppress all evidence obtained following his warrantless seizure.
(R., pp.32–33.) Mr. Gonzales argued Officer Scholten lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him
either before or after he fled. (R., pp.34–38.) The State did not file a response. (Tr. Vol. I, p.3,
Ls.13–15.) At the start of the suppression hearing, the State conceded, “This was a warrantless
arrest.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.3, Ls.23–24.) Officer Scholten and Mr. Gonzales testified. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4,
L.5–p.32, L.3.) No other evidence was offered or admitted.
At the ending of the hearing, the district court orally denied the motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.38,
L.6–p.45, L.2.) The district court determined Officer Scholten detained Mr. Gonzales when
Officer Scholten shined his flashlight in the Chevy Blazer on Mr. Gonzales, indicated he was a
law enforcement officer, and “may have” indicated a need for Mr. Gonzales to get out of the car.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.41, L.24–p.25, L.4.) The district court concluded, “[A] reasonable person could
have viewed that as being detained,” albeit a “very brief” one. (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, Ls.4–5.) Next,
the district court held there was reasonable suspicion for the detention based on the woman being
involved in the prior investigations, the woman walking away from Officer Scholten, and
Mr. Gonzales being crouched down in the backseat of the car in a dark area of the parking lot.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.2.) The district court further held Officer Scholten’s reasonable
suspicion was “heightened” once Mr. Gonzales fled. (Tr. Vol. I, p.43, L.3–17, p.43, L.23–p.44,
L.19.) Finally, the district court determined Officer Scholten had probable cause that
Mr. Gonzales committed the offense of obstructing and delaying an officer once he fled.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.44, Ls.20–23.) Therefore, the district court concluded the seizures were reasonable
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under the Fourth Amendment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.44, L.24–p.45, L.2.) About one week later, the
district court issued a written order denying the motion for the reasons stated at the hearing.
(R., p.50.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Gonzales pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance and entered an Alford3 plea to introducing major contraband into a correctional
facility. (R., pp.63, 66; Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.1–p.7, L.10, p.17, L.22–p.18, L.8.) Mr. Gonzales
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.63, 66;
Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.6–9.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Gonzales to seven years, with three years fixed, for
possession of a controlled substance, and five years, with three years fixed, for introducing major
contraband into a correctional facility, to be served concurrently. (Tr. Vol. III, p.9, L.19–p.10,
L.2.) The district court suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Gonzales on probation for three
years. (Tr. Vol. III, p.10, Ls.10–11, Ls.18–19.) Mr. Gonzales timely appealed from the district
court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.69–72, 77–80.)
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gonzales’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gonzales’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gonzales argues Officer Scholten lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him in the

parking lot. The facts known to Officer Scholten did not give him reason to believe Mr. Gonzales
had committed or was about to committed a crime. At best, Officer Scholten had an inchoate and
unparticularized hunch, which does not justify the warrantless detention. Due to the unlawful
detention, the district court should have suppressed the evidence found on Mr. Gonzales at the
jail as the fruit of the unconstitutional seizure.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de
novo. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013) (citing State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127
(2010)).
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C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Gonzales’s Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Scholten Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Seize Him
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows the seizure
fits within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Green, 158 Idaho at 886–87;
see also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002) (“When a warrantless search or seizure is
challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement is applicable.”); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014)
(same).
“[T]ypically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. However,
limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when
justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime.” State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 499–500 (1983) (plurality opinion)); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (“Limited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by
an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit,
a crime.”). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
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“[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.
Here, the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Scholten does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion for his warrantless seizure of Mr. Gonzales. The facts relied upon by the
State, and later the district court, to support a reasonable suspicion determination were: (1) a
woman parked her vehicle in a dark area of a parking lot late at night and started walking
towards an open business (La Quinta hotel); (2) Officer Scholten was familiar with the woman
because she was a suspect in theft investigations from at least one month ago; (3) the woman
refused to speak with Officer Scholten and went inside the open business; and (4) Mr. Gonzales
was lying on the floor of the woman’s car. These facts, taken independently or together, do not
justify Officer Scholten’s detention of Mr. Gonzales.
Considered independently, none of these facts are sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion particularized to Mr. Gonzales. See State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016).
First, there is no evidence the public parking lot of the La Quinta and Shari’s Restaurant is a
high-crime area. But, even if it was, “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion that the
person is committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); accord State v.
Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435 (Ct. App. 2006). Likewise, the mere fact that it was late at night or
that a car was parked in the dark area of a public parking lot (with open businesses) is inadequate
on its own to create reasonable suspicion to permit a seizure. Second, Mr. Gonzales’s “implicit
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association” with the woman “is insufficient.” Bly, 159 Idaho at 710 (citing Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968); United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 438 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
“reasonable suspicion . . . must rest on specific facts . . . tending to show that the person stopped
is in fact the person wanted in connection with a criminal investigation”)). Officer Scholten’s
testimony included no facts establishing a relationship between Mr. Gonzales and the woman, let
alone her suspected past criminal conduct. See Bly, 159 Idaho at 711 (in holding the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion, recognizing the officer did not testify to any facts connecting the
defendant to a woman suspected of drug-related activity). Mr. Gonzales’s mere presence in her
car was their only connection. This alone does not indicate Mr. Gonzales had any involvement
in, or even knowledge of, her suspected crimes from at least a month prior. Nor does it indicate
he was currently engaging in any criminal activity with her. Further, Officer Scholten’s
reasonable suspicion of the woman, which is tenuous at best, cannot be imputed to Mr. Gonzales
simply due to his presence in her vehicle. Reasonable suspicion requires more than guilty by
association. Third, Mr. Gonzales’s “lawful, albeit unusual” behavior of lying down on the
floorboard of a parked vehicle “is not enough.” Bly, 159 Idaho at 710. Many individuals choose
to rest or sleep in their vehicles. While lying on the floor, as opposed to the seat, is less common,
it is innocent conduct nonetheless. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. Gonzales saw Officer
Scholten and was lying on the floor to hide. Therefore, taken separately, the facts known to
Officer Scholten do not create reasonable suspicion to justify Mr. Gonzales’s warrantless
detention.
Looking at the facts collectively, they still fail to establish reasonable suspicion. “The
Supreme Court has previously held that otherwise innocent acts, when considered together, can
be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention.” See State v. Kelley, 160
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Idaho 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9–10). But here, the totality of the
circumstances are not “sufficiently suspicious” to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
any criminal activity specific to Mr. Gonzales. A seizure is not justified by reasonable suspicion
that something is going on. That is nothing more than “mere hunch or ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion’” on the part of the police officer. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811 (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App.
2005)). Recently, in Bly, the Court of Appeals held that there was no reasonable suspicion for a
detention where the police officer “articulated no basis justifying why” the defendant’s conduct
was “consistent with criminal activity.” 159 Idaho at 711. The Court of Appeals noted that the
officer must be able to articulate something more than “a hunch based on proximity” or just
“strange and suspicious” behavior to support a reasonable inference that the defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. Id. Similar to Bly, Officer Scholten’s testimony
provides no insight into the criminal activity he believed Mr. Gonzales committed or was about
to commit in the parked vehicle. In fact, Officer Scholten did not identify any specific crime or
even a range of crimes. Beyond his belief that Mr. Gonzales’s behavior of lying down in the
woman’s vehicle was strange or suspicious, Officer Scholten “did not articulate any basis to
support a reasonable inference that [Mr. Gonzales] had either committed, or was about to
commit, a crime.” Bly, 159 Idaho at 711. The detention was based on pure speculation.
Ultimately, the facts show Officer Scholten was acting on nothing more than an
unparticularized suspicion or mere hunch of some vague and undefined criminal activity. This is
insufficient to justify a warrantless seizure. Lacking reasonable suspicion, Officer Scholten’s
warrantless detention of Mr. Gonzales violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court
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therefore erred by determining Officer Scholten had reasonable suspicion to detain
Mr. Gonzales.

D.

The Evidence Found At The Jail Must Be Suppressed As The Fruit Of The Unlawful
Seizure In The Parking Lot
The evidence obtained from law enforcement’s search of Mr. Gonzales “would not have

come to light but for the government’s unconstitutional conduct” in detaining him in the parking
lot without reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
Mr. Gonzales’s subsequent flight, second seizure, and the agent’s warrant have no bearing on the
legality of his first seizure in the parking lot. At that time, the facts known to Officer Scholten
did not give rise to reasonable suspicion for the detention. That seizure was unlawful, and the
evidence discovered on Mr. Gonzales at the jail was derivative of the initial seizure. See State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017) (“The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both
‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’ and, pertinent here,
‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the proverbial ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree.’” (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). Mr. Gonzales
would not have fled, and Officer Scholten would not have contacted his probation officer for an
agent’s warrant, if Mr. Gonzales was not unlawfully detained in the first place.
Moreover, the State did not argue below that any exception to the exclusionary rule was
applicable, and rightfully so. (Tr. Vol. I, p.32, L.12–p.34, L.14.) Specifically, the attenuation
doctrine would not apply because the agent’s warrant was not an intervening circumstance.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722. A valid warrant, discovered during an unlawful seizure, can break
the causal chain between the unlawful seizure and the discovery of evidence. Id. at 721–22. The
warrant, however, must be “independent” of the unlawful stop. Id. at 722. The warrant must
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“predate[ ] the investigation” and be “entirely unconnected with the stop.” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.
Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016). Here, in contrast, the agent’s warrant did not predate the investigation and
was entirely connected with the stop. Officer Scholten testified that Mr. Gonzales “didn’t have
an active warrant at the time I contacted [the probation officer].” (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.9–12.)
Officer Scholten detained Mr. Gonzales until his probation officer issued the warrant. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.20, L.22–p.21, L.9.) Once the warrant was issued, Officer Scholten arrested Mr. Gonzales.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.5–7, p.21, Ls.7–9.) In fact, Officer Scholten testified that he did not arrest
Mr. Gonzales for obstructing or resisting. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.13–16, p.14, L.21–p.15, L.9.) The
agent’s warrant plainly was not pre-existing; it was dependent on the initial stop. Without an
intervening circumstance, the attenuation doctrine does not apply to the evidence found at the
jail. Therefore, the evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule.
Finally, this case is distinguishable from State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431 (Ct. App. 2006),
in which the Court of Appeals held evidence obtained after a defendant’s flight was not subject
to the exclusionary rule. In Zuniga, the police unlawfully detained the defendant, but then the
defendant fled. Id. at 733, 736. The defendant dropped contraband during the chase. Id. at 736.
The Court of Appeals held that this evidence was not suppressible because the defendant was not
seized when he dropped it. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
Had he been searched at that time and the methamphetamine found, it would have
been suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree due to the unlawful detention
without reasonable suspicion. But Zuniga decided to forgo the opportunity to
challenge his seizure at that stage. Instead, he chose to terminate the seizure
through escape from [the officer’s] authority. It would be a fiction for us to hold
that Zuniga was still under seizure by [the officer] while he was running away and
no longer submitting or yielding to [the officer’s] authority.
Id. The Court of Appeals relied on a similar case from the United States Supreme Court for its
holding. In that case, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622 (1991), the defendant threw a
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cocaine rock while he fled from the police. The United States Supreme Court held the defendant
was not seized when he dropped the drugs. Id. at 624–27. The United States Supreme Court
concluded, “The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in this case not the fruit of a
seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied.” Id. at 629. Unlike
Zuniga, and its precursor Hodari D., Mr. Gonzales was seized when the law enforcement
obtained the evidence—he was in jail. Mr. Gonzales never abandoned or dropped the
methamphetamine. It remained on his person until found by law enforcement. Although
Mr. Gonzales temporarily “terminated” the seizure by fleeing, the seizure continued once he was
detained and arrested by Officer Scholten. Because Mr. Gonzales was seized when law
enforcement found the methamphetamine, and that search and seizure stemmed from the first
unlawful seizure before his flight, the evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule.
Due to the unlawful seizure, the district court should have suppressed all evidence
obtained from law enforcement’s subsequent search of Mr. Gonzales after his arrest. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional
police conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11 (same). Accordingly, the
district court should have granted Mr. Gonzales’s suppression motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gonzales respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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